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Introduction
The increase in female labor force participation (FLFP) is one of the most significant global developments of the last decades. There is a broad consensus that this is in general a welcome trend since it may contribute to women's economic empowerment and reduce economic costs associated with the underutilization of women's skills and labor (Klasen and Lamanna, 2009; World Bank, 2011) . However, the determinants of this development are more controversial.
Many contributions to the applied labor economics literature in this context have focused on the United States and some European countries (e.g. Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986; Blundell and MaCurdy 1999; Blau and Kahn 2007) . Concerning developing countries, one strand in the field argues that there exists a U-shaped relationship between development and the labor force participation of married women (e.g. Goldin 1990 , Mammen and Paxson 2000 . This is because at very low levels of income, agriculture dominates and a large proportion of females are in unpaid agricultural employment. With rising incomes, the introduction of new production technology, and transition to a formal-sector based industrial economy, the income effect (from higher earnings of the spouse) dominates the substitution effect in the labor force participation decision of married women, leading to a fall in the FLFP rate (FLFPR). Women face negative biases against female industrial workers and the incompatibility of formal sector employment with traditional care-giving activities at this stage of the development process. As development continues, female education increases and the substitution effect begins to outweigh the income effect, leading to an increase in the FLFPR (Goldin 1990 and . However, Gaddis and Klasen (2012) show that empirical support for the U-shaped relationship between FLFPR and aggregate GDP is not robust across different data sources and specifications, and is particularly weak in non-OECD countries.
They also show that agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services generate different dynamics for female employment Another line in the literature has argued that increased openness has led to an increase in the FLFPR in developing countries. There are several interconnected channels through which globalization could lead to a feminization of the labor force. Due to existing gender discrepancies, women might be prepared to work long for a low wage and without joining a union. Therefore, exporting and multinational firms are more likely to employ women, especially since most tasks of the industries where developing countries have a comparative advantage are less skill-intensive or a priori expected to be female-intensive (Çağaty and Berik, 1990; Anderson, 2005) . Even if male-intensive sectors benefit most from increased openness, FLFP may rise in equilibrium since men might leave female-intensive industries to take up new jobs in the export sector, thereby opening up employment opportunities for women (Sauré and Zoabi, 2009) . 1 The process might be accelerated by structural adjustment programs that were often implemented in the course of increased openness since the accompanied increase in labor market flexibility would make it easier for firms to substitute women for men (Standing, 1989; Çağaty and Özler, 1995) .
Empirical contributions that we review in section 2 and summarize in the table in Appendix B have found some support for this positive relationship between globalization and FLFP.
However, they are mostly based on individual country-studies or simple pooled cross-country OLS regressions. We therefore introduce our data and methodology in section 3 and improve on previous studies in a number of ways. First, we reduce potential parameter biases due to unobserved cross-country heterogeneity by basing identification exclusively on over-time variation. Second, we investigate heterogeneity of effects across age cohorts. Third, we accommodate the sectoral structure of the investigated economies by allowing for interactions of FDI with industrial / agricultural value added and considering overall trade, overall exports and exports in services separately. Finally, we estimate separate coefficients by region to allow for regional heterogeneity. We present our results in section 4. Contrary to the main contributions of the literature, our results suggest that globalization generally has a negative effect on FLFP which is more pronounced among younger age cohorts and depends on the industrial structure of the economy. There also appears to be a large degree of regional heterogeneity in the results. We discuss the results and conclude the paper in section 5.
Review of the Empirical Literature
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Based on rather descriptive and anecdotal evidence, early case studies such as Cho and Koo (1983) , Hein (1984) , ILO (1985) , or, later on, by Kabeer and Mahmu (2004) suggest that aspects related to globalization, such as export-led industrialization, export processing zones and increased employment in multinational firms have had a positive impact on FLFP. Using 1 Similarly, arguments in line with the agricultural linkages literature (Lele and Mellor, 1981; Lele, 1973, 1975) can be built where the openness-induced surge in the male-intensive sector also spills over to the female-intensive sector through production and consumption linkages. 2 We also provide an overview of the related empirical literature in the table in Appendix B.
a fairly simple OLS regression for 3-digit SIC Turkish manufacturing industries in 1966 and 1982 , Çağaty and Berik (1990 show that the ratio of exports to output had a statistically significant positive impact on the female share of wage workers. A similar empirical strategy is applied to Indian industry data from the late 1990s and early 2000s by Pradhan (2006) , who finds that exports have a significant and positive (though economically small) impact on the female/male working-days ratio, while FDI has no significant impact.
Özler (2000) builds upon this strand of the literature by using plant-level data for the period 1983-1985 from the Turkish manufacturing sector and shows that the female share of employment in a plant increases with the export to total output ratio of its sector. In line with the arguments above, she notes that women are often employed in low-skill and low-paid jobs and especially among those establishments where investment in machinery and equipment leads to a decline in the female employment share, thus pointing to dynamic long-run effects disadvantageous to a feminization of the labor force (in this context, see also Wood, 1998 and Seguino, 2000) . This suggests, globalization may first lead to an expansion of femaleintensive sectors which then rationalize production by investment and technological progress.
However, while the plant-level perspective of the study has certain advantages, it fails to convincingly resolve the problem of an unobserved heterogeneity bias and cannot reveal any spill-over effects on non-manufacturing sectors. Such spill-over effects are documented in Gaddis and Pieters (2012) , who show that trade liberalization reforms in Brazil in the late 1980s and early 1990s were associated with an increase in female labor force participation after a period of around two years, caused largely by rising female employment in the nontradable (service) sector.
Tying in with the above-mentioned literature on the feminization-U, Çağaty and Özler (1995) use another approach by using pooled data from 1985 and 1990 for 165 countries to investigate the impact of long-term development on the female share of the labor force. They argue that structural adjustment policies have led to an increase in feminization of the labor force via worsening income distribution and increased openness. Gray et al (2006) While there are some opposite arguments highlighting that FDI in developing economies benefits male engineers or computer programmers more than female ones because they are likely to be better educated (Oostendorp, 2009) , or pointing to occupational gender segregation (Greenhalgh, 1985; Anker, 1998 , Anker et al., 2003 , 3 the large majority of empirical studies seems to suggest that globalization has raised FLFP in developing countries.
In our view, however, these supposed "stylized facts" suffer from certain methodological shortcomings that give rise to our empirical re-assessment. First, we find it risky to generalize from country-case studies to an overarching tale of globalization, feminization and development. On the other hand, most cross-country studies so far have suffered from the problem of potentially biased estimates due to unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, rather short time dimensions have imposed certain restrictions on the equilibrium dynamics of the relationship between openness and FLFP. By using a comprehensive panel of 80 developing countries over almost three decades and applying a fixed-effects methodology, we can deal with all of these potential problems and show that this leads to quite contrary results than the ones obtained in the mainstream literature.
Data and Methodology
Data
We use data on FLFP from the 5 th revision of the ILO's Estimates and Projections of the Economically Active Population (EAPEP) database (ILO, 2009) . The EAPEP contains data on the male and female economically active population based on country reports and ILO staff estimates for 191 countries, which includes both industrialized and developing countries.
The 5 th revision data cover the period 1980 -2008; the data thus have a high overlap with our FDI and trade data. In line with Gray et al. (2006) and Gaddis and Klasen (2012) and in order to minimize problems associated with serial correlation and to focus more on long-run effects, we consider the observations for every fifth year over the period 1980 -2005 for estimation.
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The FLFPR is defined as the number of economically active women divided by the total female population (FPOP) of the relevant age group j in country i at time t:
The ILO definition of economic activity captures all persons (employed or unemployed) that supply labor for activities included in the United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA;
cf. ILO, 1990 ). This includes self-employment for the production of marketed goods and services as well as the production of goods consumed within the household. It does, however, not include the production of non-marketed services (domestic tasks, nursing of own children), since they are not included in the SNA. This distinction is important to remember, as many women outside of the labor force are employed in producing such non-marketed services. It should also be noted that the EAPEP data only provide information on economic activity rates, but not on total hours worked. Hence, the data allows us to investigate changes in labor supply at the extensive margin (participation decision) but not at the intensive margin (hours worked). Since we focus on developing countries, we follow the convention in the literature to consider countries classified as "low income" or "lower middle income" by the World Bank (for 1987, the first year available). This gives us a sample of 80 developing countries in total.
Descriptive Analysis
Figure 1 plots the distribution of the FLFPR for three decades (in 1985, in 1995 and in 2005). 6 As one can see, the distribution gets smoother in the center in 2005 when compared to the decades before, which is also reflected in a decreasing standard error in table 1. The steadily increasing mean of the distribution in table 1 also shows that FLFP indeed increased over the period usually referred to as "globalization."
5 If we aggregate their data over various cohorts, we use the ILO female population data as weights. Linear interpolation is used to obtain data points between the 5-year survey intervals. This is necessary since most explanatory variables are lagged by one year. 6 In order to make the data in and between figures 1 and 2 comparable, we only used observations which have no missing observations for FLFPR, FDI/GDP and trade/GDP in 1985, 1995 and 2005 for both graphs. We end up with 77 (developing) countries. 
Econometric Model
Following the literature of determinants of FLFP (Bloom et al., 2009; Çağaty and Özler, 1995; Gaddis and Klasen, 2012; Mammen and Paxson, 2000) , we estimate a linear model where the dependent variable is the female labor force participation rate (FLFPR) in levels and is explained by a number of covariates x:
where u is an error term discussed below.
Our dataset thus has two levels of cross-sections: countries i=1,...,N and age cohorts 7 7 The age cohorts are 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, and 60-64 . We excluded the cohort of 65+ years from our analysis because labor force participation in this cohort is driven by factors that might be very different from other cohorts.
j=1,...,10. In our model, which hence can be considered as "hierarchical", we use countryspecific cohort fixed effects, i.e. fixed effects for every cohort which are allowed to vary by country. The reason is, first, that unobserved heterogeneity across countries is likely and the same holds for age cohorts. For example, the age cohort 15-19 years is less likely to join the labor force than the age cohort 35-39 if the former has a higher probability of being in education. Furthermore, we assume that these cohort-fixed effects are country-specific due to different educational systems and differing conceptions of life across countries. Note that not controlling for this unobserved heterogeneity will result in biased and inconsistent results if the heterogeneity is correlated with some right-hand side variables. This is a clear advantage over previous cross-section studies in the field. In our sample of 80 countries with 10 age cohorts, this leads to 80×10 = 800 cross-section fixed effects.
Furthermore, we control for time-fixed effects. This is motivated by the consideration that there may be global effects influencing FLFP which are correlated with our covariables. This may lead to both, biased results and cross-sectional dependence in the structure of the error term. Formally,
where Z is a 10N·T × k matrix collecting the k country and cohort-specific covariables, X is a 10N·T × m matrix collecting the m country-specific covariables and u has the structure
where μ and γ are the country-cohort and time fixed effects, respectively, which are estimated and ε is an i.i.d. error term. 8 Note that we only take every fifth observation in time, i.e. t=1980, 1985, …, 2005 and that the only cohort-specific covariable in Z is the educational data (hence, k=1). In each of the columns of X, there will be 10 identical entries.
In summary, our identification strategy exclusively uses the data variation within the countryspecific cohorts over 5-year intervals, accounting for global shocks at every point in time.
8 A potential shortfall of the FE estimator is the fact that the process we explore is likely to have a complex dynamic structure while FE can be seen as a 'short-run' estimator. An alternative dynamic estimator, however, is difficult to specify depending on the complexity of the dynamic process and will potentially suffer severely from parameter heterogeneity (cf. e.g. Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Phillips and Sul, 2003) which is in fact present as we show in later parts of this study. The FE estimator, in our view, has the advantage that its properties are studied extensively and well-known. Furthermore, our main explanatory variables, FDI stocks and trade (or, exports) relative to GDP are very persistent variables. Under such circumstances the static fixed-effects estimator can be biased from a (consistent) short-run estimator towards the long-run impact. More explanations and evidence are given in Baltagi and Griffin (1984) , Egger and Pfaffermayer (2005) , and Wacker (2012) but the main intuition is the fact that in the presence of an omitted lag structure, the high correlation between the included variable and its own lags causes an omitted variable bias by incorporating the impacts of deeper lags. We hence think that our FE estimates come at a relatively low risk, especially as we are using only every 5 th observation year (hence looking at longer time periods), and will give a good intuition about the underlying economic forces at work. We discuss potential extensions for future research in the concluding section of this paper.
Error Structure of the Model
A concern of our model is the correlation structure of the idiosyncratic error ε. Despite using a 5-year interval, autocorrelation is one potential issue. Together with potential heteroscedasticity, this can easily be accommodated by using the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) robust approach of Huber (1967) and White (1980) to estimate the variance-covariance (VCV) matrix. However, the hierarchical structure of our model (cf. Wooldridge, 2003 and 2010: ch. 20 for an introductory treatment to such models) poses additional problems since, for example, the error ε ijt is likely to be correlated with the error ε i,j+1,t+1 because the individuals in cohort j in period t will be in cohort j+1 in period t+1.
Furthermore, there might be correlation between all errors ε .jt within country i if there is a systematic measurement error on the country level. All these potential problems with standard inference in linear models point to different forms of error correlation within countries. In line with the conventional panel data literature and given the dimension of our data set, we can assume that N → ∞ and hence the number of countries, which are considered to be the "clusters," is large while the size of these clusters (i.e. the cohorts by country) is small. As discussed in Wooldridge (2003: 134, see also 2010: 864ff) a robust estimate for the VCV matrix is obtained by clustering the errors on the country level. Assuming that the matrix W i contains all fixed effects and explanatory variables, classified as X and Z above, for country i and that the corresponding parameter vector δ contains β, θ, μ, and γ, a robust VCV estimator for δ is given by
where ε � i is the 10T × 1 vector of residuals for country (i.e. cluster) i.
An alternative approach would be using some feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) model. Depending on the assumptions, this might provide statistically more efficient results, it is, however, computationally less efficient. We hence prefer our approach because we find the assumptions less demanding and in the worst case, our framework will provide conservative inference compared with potentially efficient FGLS results.
Using time-fixed effects is important in this context because it prevents the most likely form of cross-section, i.e.
contemporaneous, correlation of the error term. We want to emphasize that clustering the errors at the country level has a tremendous impact on inference, as one would expect (cf. Wooldridge, 2010: 865) . If one would (wrongly) cluster on the country-specific cohort level instead, which would be the standard option in most econometric packages, standard errors would be severely underestimated (cf. 
Empirical Results
The first four columns of table 2 show regressions of the FLFPR on our main globalization variables without controlling for other effects (besides the fixed effects). One can see that the impact is negative throughout and statistically significant 10 only in two specifications for trade and exports. Note that trade and FDI are highly correlated, 11 so multicollinearity inflates standard errors (while parameter estimates are still consistent) and we therefore report specifications with both variables together and separately. The negative impact of trade is driven by exports, so we focus on exports for the remainder of the analysis. The most striking fact besides from wanting statistical significance and the negative sign of the estimated coefficient, is the notably small economic relevance of both effects. The highest parameter is -0.064 for exports in column (4) The remaining models in table 2 include our seven control variables. While there is some change in the levels of statistical significance, our overall result remains rather stable: There is no evidence so far, that globalization had an economically relevant impact on female labor market participation. With the control variables included, it is the FDI stock that seems to be more robust statistically, however, the magnitude is negligible since the estimated parameter, -0.0116 in the "best" case, implies that a 10 percentage points increase in FDI stock / GDP leads to a 0.12 percentage points decrease of FLFPR. Exports are only statistically significant when FDI stock is excluded (though standard errors are reasonable in model (5) as well), the economic relevance is barely higher than in the unconditional model (4), however.
10 Unless stated otherwise we refer to statistical significance as significance at the 5 % level and call significance at the 10 % and 1 % level as weakly and strongly statistically significant, respectively. 11 Regressing FDI stock / GDP on the other covariables of model (7) using the same subsample and each 5 th yearly observation leads to a highly significant estimator of 0.267 for trade / GDP (t-statistic 2.58).
-13- These first results do not necessarily mean that our measures for globalization have no impact on women in their decision to join the labor force -they are aggregate effects and capture a wide range of different activities. In table 3 and figure 3 we show the impact of our measure on different cohorts. (Note that the vertical axis is differently scaled for the two panels in figure 3 .) This means that we allow the parameter for the impact of our globalization variables to vary between age cohorts. The overall picture that emerges shows that the impact is stronger for younger cohorts. This corresponds to the rationale that more labor market variability in going on at younger age levels and that the income effect might be particularly strong at these cohorts when compared to the substitution effect: A potential rise in wages due to a globalization boost might increase household income via the father's or spouse's wage bill whereas the substitution effect between staying out of the labor force or joining it may even become negative in the short run since the skill-premia might have risen and this creates supplementary incentives to stay currently out of the labor force and invest in education, especially for young women where the premium pays off over a longer lifetime.
While the impact is still very small for FDI, the impact of exports is now considerable for young females' labor decision: The parameter is 0.254 and 0.159 for the age groups 15-19 and 20-24, respectively. A parameter of 0.2 would imply that a 10 percentage point increase in exports would result in a 2 percentage point decrease in the FLFPR, a non-negligible effect. Note that the estimated impact is negative for all cohorts for both measures of globalization but not for all of them statistically significant in case of exports (the interval of +/-2 standard errors roughly approximates a pointwise 95 % confidence interval). th year. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively.
What could explain such a pattern? If one thinks within a standard trade framework, after trade-liberalization, countries will develop those sectors of their economy where they have a comparative advantage. For least developed countries these are lower-skilled labor intensive industries. While women may have a "natural" advantage in some of these industries (for example, certain tasks in the textile sector), most other tasks may benefit from physical strength and hence primarily demand male labor. Accordingly, we would expect that the impact depends on the country's comparative advantage and this would suggest that the impact should generally be different between regions and depend on the country's competitive advantage. This is supported by a view at table A.2 in the appendix. For example, we find significant negative impacts of exports on female labor force participation in South and East Asia, and of FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa. Conversely we find a positive effect of FDI on women's economic activity in Eastern Europe/Central Asia. Generally, the table shows a considerable degree of variety between the different regions. It is also noteworthy that the primary sector exhibits a strong positive (and statistically highly significant) impact on FLFP in the MENA countries, whereas industry value added implies a negative and relevant (highly significant) impact in this region. This probably reflects the high share of mining (particularly from oil exploitation) in industrial value added in the region, a sector which traditionally employs few women (see also Gaddis and Klasen 2012: 20) . Sectoral movements also seem to play an important role in the Eastern European/Central Asian countries.
Another exercise supports this view, see table 4. In the first two columns we allow FDI to interact with the value added in the industry sector and the primary sector, respectively. In the first column, FDI stock is highly significant and negative with a similar magnitude as in model (5) of table 2, the interaction is about 3.5 times the size of the mere FDI parameter and positive. 13 This means that once the industrial sector is developed, more FDI will have a positive impact on FLFP. More precisely, once the industrial sector accounts for at least 28 % of value added of the developing country's economy, additional FDI will have a positive impact.
14 13 The parameter itself is not statistically significant (t-statistic 1.34). The relevant test statistic, however, is an Ftest for joint significance of FDI and the interaction term. Here, we can reject that they jointly have no impact on FLFPR on the 1 % level of statistical significance.
The magnitude is still low: Assuming that the whole economy is producing half or all of its output in the industrial goods sector, a 10 percentage point increase in FDI stock / GDP will cause a 0.14 or 0. These results imply that the factor demand of multinational firms does not necessarily have a (conditional) anti-female bias since the above mentioned negative impact of FDI appears to be mainly driven by changes in the industry structure. This is supported by column (2) in table 4 where we allow FDI to interact with the primary sector. The negative impact of FDI now vanishes; it becomes insignificant and positive while the interaction with the primary sector is negative and insignificant.
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Similarly, with trade in column (3) of table 4 we find that its negative impact is, somewhat surprisingly, driven by trade in services -including trade in services into the model turns the overall export parameter estimate statistically insignificant, whereas trade in services is negative and highly significant but of small magnitude. This result is rather surprising on a first view because one would expect that women are very likely to work in the service sector.
However, especially in the tradable service sector, the skill-premium might be high, hence inducing young women to invest more into education and hence stay off the labor market in younger cohorts. Furthermore, these results are in line with the findings of Oostendorp (2009) that globalization may benefit male engineers or computer programmers more than female ones because they are likely to be better educated, and with an aspect of the results of Bussmann (2009 Bussmann ( : 1035 , that globalization is related to a lower percentage of women employed in the service sector in non-OECD countries.
15 They are jointly significant on the 1 % level using an F-test but the magnitude of the effect is again small. 
In our view, this functional form has the advantage that it is economically more appealing than the standard models in the literature because it allows for interactions of covariables and does not force the response to be linear in the latter. Second, the model in equation (6) is more flexible because it does not pose the implicit restriction α = 1. 16 Third, the model in equation (6) avoids meaningless predictions of the response variable. 17 Finally, the model in equation (6) is not necessarily more difficult to interpret because changes in any covariable can be interpreted as elasticity of FLFP (if the covariable is itself in logs) or as a percentage change in FLFP if the covariable changes by one unit (if it is not in logs).
The results from this exercise, reported in table A.3 in the appendix, are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained above. Parameter estimates for the interaction of FDI with industry value 16 Note that if the restriction α = 1 is indeed true, a restricted estimator will be more efficient than the model in equation (6). However, in the context of such a sample as large as the present one, we find this of minor relevance though it may be important for policy making and evaluation on the country level when facing a much smaller sample. 17 Note that a linear model like in equation (2) may lead to predictions of the FLFPR that are smaller than 0 or larger than 100 % which does not make sense economically. Since in the model E[ln(FLFP)] = Xθ, the predictor for FLFP is e Xθ , which is a positive number for any value of Xθ, a meaningful prediction of FLFP is ensured.
added and for FDI are statistically significant and highly significant, respectively, and are jointly highly significant (F-statistic of 5.53 with 2 and 79 degrees of freedom). While the prefix of the parameter estimates are the same as in table 4, the positive impact of the interaction is more dominant over the negative impact of the FDI stock: A positive impact of FDI on FLFP occurs at a level of industrial value added above 16.2 % of GDP. More precisely, for an economy producing half or all of its output in the industrial goods sector, a 10 % increase in FDI will cause a 0.8 or 2.1 % increase in FLFP, respectively. For this functional form, we also find that trade in services absorbs the negative impact of exports.
Discussion and Conclusion
We have investigated the influence of globalization as measured by trade and FDI on the suggest that openness generally has a negative but small impact on the FLFPR -which is in contrast to most previous studies that have generally found a positive effect. As an additional improvement over the previous literature, we have shown that the effect is stronger for young women. We think this is driven by the flexibility in younger years and by the fact that the potential rise in the skill premium due to globalization creates a particularly strong incentive for younger women to invest in education (and to hence not join the labor force) because the returns will be realized over a longer (expected) remaining lifetime. Both theoretical models and micro-econometric studies might help address this channel in the future.
A main takeaway from our study is that one should be very cautious in generalizing results from country-level studies to an overarching tale about the female labor market effects of globalization. First, we have shown that the effect, though being statistically significant, is negligible in economic terms. Also, the results presented in table A.2 show a large degree of regional heterogeneity. Our finding of a statistically significant positive effect of FDI on the FLFPR in Eastern Europe and Central Asia compared with a significant negative effect in Africa further supports our notion that the potentially increased skill-premium due to globalization/FDI creates incentives to build up human capital before joining the labor force:
A high human capital stock (with relatively low gender inequality) was a heritage from the past in former centrally planned economies and would allow women to join the labor force and reap the benefits from an increased skill-premium right away, whereas female educational attainment is much lower in Africa (cf. Barro and Lee, 2010: table 3).
Since we show that the direction of the FDI impact on FLFPR depends on the size of the industrial/primary sector, our results strongly suggest that any economic explanation about the impact of globalization on FLFP has to take into account the industrial structure of the economy under consideration. Potential arguments could be built along the lines of a Lewis (1954) type labor market: In agrarian economies, a large pool of laborers is available. Since comparative advantages of these economies lies in sectors intensively using physical labor and surplus labor keeps wages low, multinational and exporting firms might be more likely to go for the "low hanging fruits" by drawing from the pool of male laborers. By still paying a somewhat higher wage (cf. Lipsey, 2002) , the income effect on the household level might then have a small negative impact on FLFP and the mainstream argument of a femaleintensive comparative-advantage sector does not hold for these countries. The more industrialized a country becomes, the smaller the pool of (male) surplus labor becomes and multinational and exporting firms might hence demand more female labor, especially since the process of industrial development and the division of labor will create linkages with the service sector where female labor is not "physically disadvantaged" and gender wage gaps might even provide an incentive to employ women, so that the mainstream arguments come into force at this development stage.
Our results can be seen in the context of the finding of Gaddis and Klasen (2012) that different industrial structures of the economy generate different dynamics for female employment. They also do not necessarily conflict with the results of previous case studies since they have been conducted in countries where industrial development was rather high compared with other developing economies which might have drive the results of these country-case studies.
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In terms of welfare and policy, our results of a generally negative effect of globalization on FLFPR is not necessarily bad news for women since their decrease in labor force participation might simply be the optimal response to benefit from an increased skill premium or because household income is sufficiently high and allows women to stay home if they want to. Indeed, 18 The sampling period of Cagaty and Berik (1990) coincides with the time when Turkey reached the threshold level of industrial development of 28 % that we find in our study. Özler (2000) uses data from the mid-1980s when the size of the industrial sector in Turkey was about 27 % and hence close to our threshold of 28 % and clearly above the threshold of 16 % found in the multiplicative model. The data of Kabeer and Mahmu (2004) 
